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Abstract In this article the Derrida/Foucault debate is scrutinised with two closely 
related aims in mind: (1) reconsidering the way in which Foucault’s texts, and 
especially the more recently published lectures, should be read; and (2) establishing 
the relation between law and madness. The article firstly calls for a reading of 
Foucault which exceeds metaphysics with the security it offers, by taking account of 
Derrida’s reading of Foucault as well as of the heterogeneity of Foucault’s texts. The 
article reflects in detail on a text of Derrida on Foucault (‘Cogito and the History of 
Madness’) as well as a text of Foucault on Blanchot (‘Maurice Blanchot: The Thought 
from Outside’). The latter text shows that Foucault was at times acutely aware of the 
difficulty involved in exceeding metaphysics and that he realised the importance in 
this regard of a reflection on literature. These reflections tie in closely with Foucault’s 
History of Madness as well as with Derrida’s reflections on literature and on 
madness. Both Derrida and Foucault contend that law has much to learn from 
literature in understanding the relation between itself and madness. Literature more 
specifically points to law’s ‘origin’ in madness. The article contends that a failure to 
take seriously this origin, also in the reading of Foucault’s lectures, would amount to a 
denial by law of itself. 
 
Keywords Madness · Derrida · Foucault · Descartes · Freud · Blanchot · Cogito · 
Language · Death · Reason 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Whether acknowledged or not, the question of madness has arguably always been of 
central concern for philosophical thinking. This is seemingly different from the 
position in law where madness generally seems to play a much more restricted role, 
in modern law more specifically because of the assumptions of ‘normal’ subjectivity. 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida can be said to have questioned radically the 
predominant position as to the relationship between law and madness, showing that 
madness is as important for law as it is for philosophical thinking. Derrida’s claims 
are perhaps the best-known in this regard. In ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical 
Foundation of Authority”’, he describes justice inter alia as ‘without reason and 
without theoretical rationality, in the sense of regulating mastery’. He then notes that 
‘one can recognize in it, even accuse in it a madness’, and adds that ‘deconstruction is 
mad about and from such justice, mad about and from this desire for justice’ (Derrida 
2002, p. 254). With reference to Kierkegaard, Derrida (2002, p. 255) furthermore 
refers to the instant of decision as madness. This assessment of the relation between 
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law and madness stems at least partly from Derrida’s earlier debate with Foucault on 
the question of madness.1 In Derrida’s 1963 lecture ‘Cogito and the History of 
Madness’ (Derrida 1978, pp. 31-63), which also includes a reference to the above-
mentioned passage from Kierkegaard, he provides a detailed reading of Foucault’s 
History of Madness, published in 1961 (Foucault 2006). Foucault responded in 1972 
in two texts which have recently been included in the first complete English 
translation of the History (Foucault 2006, pp. 550-590).2 Although the debate 
between Derrida and Foucault has been the subject of much academic discussion,3 
the relation between the Foucault/Derrida debate and law has not as yet been fully 
explored. This debate is of great importance for the current attempts to revisit 
Foucault’s thinking on law in light of the recently published lectures.4  
 The present article will enquire into the relation between law and madness in 
the texts of Derrida and Foucault, showing how this relation ties in closely with 
language and desire. This enquiry will concern itself with the ‘site’ from which 
Foucault launches his radical critique of the practices of modernity which we tend to 
view as ‘normal’ and arguably allows for Foucault’s project to be further radicalised. 
Although Derrida’s texts will be afforded a certain privilege, what is at stake here is 
not simply a ‘Derridean’ reading imposed upon Foucault but the exploration of the 
heterogeneity in Foucault’s own texts. Apart from the History, a text of Foucault that 
will be looked at in some detail in exploring this heterogeneity is ‘Maurice Blanchot: 
The Thought from Outside’, published in 1966 (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, pp. 7-
58). The importance of this text lies in the exploration there by Foucault of the law of 
literature which ties in closely with Derrida’s reading of the History of Madness, with 
Derrida’s explorations of literature, as well as with Derrida’s thinking on law and 
justice. The article will start with a reading of ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’, 
which will take place also with reference to ‘To do Justice to Freud’ where Derrida 
(1998, pp. 70-118) explains the background to his ‘Cogito’ essay.5 This will assist us in 
our discussion of Foucault’s ‘Maurice Blanchot: The thought from Outside’ which will 
follow thereafter. The article will conclude by pointing to the implications of these 
readings of Foucault and Derrida for law. These texts on madness, desire, death and 
language, it will be contended, allow the law itself to appear in its inevitable 
withdrawal. 
 
Cogito and the History of Madness 
 
In his reading of Foucault’s History of Madness, Derrida focuses primarily on the 
Preface of the History as well as Foucault’s reading of Descartes’s Meditations (1641) 
                                                 
1
 For other reflections of Derrida on madness, see also Derrida and Thévenin (1998) and Derrida (2008, pp. 87-
103).  
2
 An abridged edition was published in English in 1967 as Madness and Civilization; A History of Insanity in the 
Age of Reason, based for the most part on an abridged French edition published in 1964. 
3
 Excellent commentaries on this debate are provided by inter alia Felman (1975); Flynn (1989); McNay (1994, 
pp. 31-37); and Naas (2003, pp. 57-75).  
4
 See Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009) who ably summarise the issues at stake in this regard.  
5
 The debate with Foucault was in a sense continued posthumously in this essay, which traces the intersection 
between the thinking of Foucault and Freud. For reasons of space this essay cannot be analysed here in detail. 
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in chapter II of part one of the History. Only a small part of Foucault’s History of 
Madness concerns itself explicitly with an interpretation of Descartes’s Meditations, 
but according to Derrida the whole of Foucault’s project is tied to this interpretation.6 
Despite appearances to the contrary, Derrida does not seek to undermine Foucault’s 
project or place it in question, but rather to sharpen its edges ‘philosophically’.7 In 
analysing these two texts, and before engaging in a fairly detailed analysis of Derrida’s 
reading of Descartes’s Meditations, we will seek answers to the following questions:  
 
• Can a history of madness be written? 
• From which ‘site’ does Foucault write his history of madness? 
• When did the ‘internment’ of madness start? 
• With which concept of madness does Foucault work? 
 
The impossibility of a history of madness 
 
Central to Derrida’s concerns is Foucault’s claim to write the archaeology of the 
silence imposed on madness through the division between madness and reason. In 
other words, Foucault attempts to write a history of madness itself, by letting 
madness itself speak (Derrida 1978, pp. 33-34; Foucault 2006, pp. xxviii, xxxii). 
Stated differently, Foucault does not want to write this history from within the 
language of reason, of madness interned, but of madness before its capture by 
knowledge. This history, as Derrida (1978, p. 34) puts it, purports to be a history of 
untamed madness before being caught by classical reason, whilst using the language 
that was used to capture madness. The language of reason is however itself the 
language of order and of the system of objectivity which necessarily captures or 
objectifies madness. This raises the question whether a ‘history’ of silence can in fact 
be written, as all history, per definition, is of rationality and meaning in general 
(Derrida 1978, p. 308 n. 4). In his later discussion of Descartes’s Meditations, Derrida 
(1978, pp. 53-54) phrases this principle thus: 
 
[I]f discourse and philosophical communication (that is, language itself) are to 
have an intelligible meaning, that is to say, if they are to conform to their essence 
and vocation as discourse, they must simultaneously in fact and in principle escape 
madness….By its essence the sentence is normal. 
 
The question this raises is whether one can, by elaborating on the ways in which 
psychiatry has excluded reason and by suspending the language of psychiatry, return 
to innocence and end one’s own complicity in the exclusion of madness by the 
rational and political order (Derrida 1978, p. 35; Flynn 1989, p. 203). The psychiatrist 
is after all only a delegate of this order, one of many. As Derrida points out, all 
                                                 
6
 This is borne out, at least superficially, by Descartes’s re-appearance in various places throughout the History 
of Madness.  
7
 The quotation marks are required here because of Derrida’s relation to philosophy. As is well-known, he is not 
simply opposed to philosophy (a position which Foucault at times adopts and which as we will see below 
ultimately remains philosophical), but seeks to exceed philosophy from within in a rigorous manner. 
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European languages are implicit in the adventure of Western reason as well as in the 
delegations which have led to the capture of reason. It therefore seems to be 
impossible to put on trial this history (of the objectification of madness) as Foucault 
seeks to do, as the proceedings as well as the verdict are, due simply to their 
articulation, bound to repeat the crime. Even an archaeology of silence amounts to a 
logic, an organised language, an order and a work. Foucault’s archaeology of silence 
therefore effectively amounts to a repetition of the act of excluding and objectifying 
madness, also at the moment when this exclusion is denounced (Derrida 1978, pp, 35, 
53-54). Derrida (1978, pp. 36-37) nevertheless reads Foucault as being aware of this, 
at least on a certain level, as Foucault at certain points acknowledges the impossibility 
of writing this archaeology of silence. Foucault (2006, p. xxxii) for example 
acknowledges the necessity and impossibility of having to write this history without 
the support of the syntax of reason. Derrida comments that Foucault could perhaps 
be said to perform this feat (that is, his archaeology of silence) through his practice 
rather than his formulation. In other words, because the silence cannot be spoken 
without at the same time re-captivating it within logos – the language of 
objectification - Foucault gives expression to it through his pathos, by means of his 
new and radical silent praise of folly. Behind Foucault’s explicit project, another 
project can thus be said to take place in silence.8 This raises the question of 
conditions of possibility. What makes possible Foucault’s feat? How does it happen 
that Foucault can at the point in time that he writes his History of Madness, 
understand and enunciate this breaking point in the classical age (spanning 
approximately from 1650 to 1800) between a determined reason and a determined 
madness (to be distinguished from reason and madness in general)? Foucault does 
not explicitly reflect on this in his History. Derrida’s contention is that this could 
happen only because of a certain liberation of madness, because a dislocation 
between madness and unreason had already gotten underway in psychiatry (Derrida 
1978, p. 38). Implicit in this statement is the importance of Freud’s thinking, which as 
Derrida suggests, made possible Foucault’s project (Derrida 1998, p. 73).9 
Behind Foucault’s projected archaeology of silence, another project is therefore 
engaged in. To understand what is at stake here, we need to enquire into the way in 
which these two projects proceed. Because the silence of madness is not an original 
silence but one which (according to Foucault) was imposed at a certain point in 
history, Foucault feels the need to find the origin of this imposition. He has to find the 
origin of the separation between reason and madness (unreason) in contrast with 
their free circulation and exchange up to that point (Derrida 1978, p. 38). Foucault 
(2006, p. xxxiii) refers to this origin as ‘the decision’. According to Derrida (1978, pp. 
38-39) a slight change in vocabulary is required here: the split between reason and 
madness should rather be referred to as a ‘dissension’, in order to point to the self-
                                                 
8
 These comments clearly show that a reading of Derrida’s ‘Cogito’ which is to the effect that he believes that 
there is no escape from or no space outside of reason (see Boyne 1990, pp. 53-89) is on the wrong track. 
9
 Derrida’s enquiry into the (ambivalent) relation between Foucault and Freud in ‘To do Justice to Freud’ 
(Derrida 1998, pp. 70-118), focuses specifically on the relation between Freud’s reflections on the death drive in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud 2001, pp. 1-64) and the ‘space’ within which Foucault’s project is 
inscribed. Derrida’s reading of Freud’s death drive ties in closely with the discussion of literature below (Derrida 
1987a, pp. 257-409). 
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dividing action at stake here, that is, what is made exterior, is the interior (Derrida 
1978, pp. 38-39). Once one recognises the importance of this change in vocabulary, a 
number of questions are raised which require a rethinking of some aspects of 
Foucault’s analysis. These relate specifically to the question referred to earlier as to 
when the internment of madness started. Foucault (2006, p. xxix) more particularly 
presents the Greek logos as having had no contrary. At the same time he refers to the 
‘reassuring dialectic of Socrates’ in relation to the Greek notion of hybris, which as 
Derrida (1978, p. 40) points out, shows (when read together with the texts of Greek 
philosophers) that the Greek logos had ‘already expulsed, excluded, objectified or 
(curiously amounting to the same thing) assimilated and mastered as one of its 
moments, “enveloped” the contrary of reason’. This means, contrary to Foucault’s 
assertion, that the separation between reason and its other had not taken place (for 
the first time) in the classical age, but long before then. The entire history of 
philosophy and of reason bears witness to this struggle. Since the Greeks, reason has 
been divided against itself, and whatever happened afterwards (including the events 
as described by Foucault) are only socio-economic epiphenomena that take place on 
the surface. Madness therefore does not start being confined in the classical age; this 
internment already starts with the awakening of language. The risk Foucault runs in 
writing a history of madness in this way is to assume a unity of original presence 
followed by a subsequent event of division, thereby confirming metaphysics in its 
fundamental operation.10   
This brings us to the question of the concept of madness in the History. Derrida 
(1978, p. 41) points out that the concept of madness is never submitted to thematic 
scrutiny by Foucault. Nonetheless,  
 
everything transpires as if Foucault knew what “madness” means. Everything 
transpires as if, in a continuous and underlying way, an assured and rigorous 
precomprehension of the concept of madness, or at least its nominal definition, 
were possible and acquired. In fact, however, it could be demonstrated that as 
Foucault intends it, if not by the historical current he is studying, the concept of 
madness overlaps everything that can be put under the rubric of negativity.  
 
The allusion here is of course to Hegel, and the implication is that Foucault 
understands madness in a restricted sense, more specifically in terms of the popular 
and equivocal notion of madness (Derrida 1978, p. 41). Derrida’s ‘understanding’ of 
madness as we will see below is much more ‘radical’ for the reason, as he points out, 
that reason’s constitution of itself, lies at the origin of history; it is historicity itself 
(Derrida 1978, p. 42). In other words, the exclusion of a certain madness is the 
condition of possibility of meaning and of language. This at the same time implies 
that what happens in the classical age as described by Foucault ‘has neither absolute 
privilege nor archetypal exemplarity’ (Derrida 1978, p. 42). It is merely an example 
                                                 
10
 As Flynn (1989, pp. 214-215) points out, the procedure of positing an inside and an outside (as Foucault does 
regarding reason and madness) is also a fundamental metaphysical move. 
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among others of the way in which a certain madness is dealt with in history.  As we 
will see below, much of this ‘criticism’ is later implicitly accepted by Foucault. 
 
Descartes’s Meditations 
 
We next arrive at the important discussion of Descartes’ Meditations, which Foucault 
engages in at the beginning of chapter II of part one of the History of Madness. It 
goes to the heart of the question of the ‘meaning’ of madness and thus requires 
careful scrutiny. Foucault views these passages as the philosophical internment of 
madness (Derrida 1978, p. 44) and we can see clearly from his reading how he 
understands madness in a restricted sense (in line with Hegel’s negativity).11 
Descartes in the First Meditation seeks to question all the opinions he has held up 
until then so as to ultimately arrive at a point where he holds onto only those 
opinions which are certain and indubitable. For this purpose he does not enquire into 
every opinion so held but only into its foundations. This is carried through in three 
successive stages. (1) He firstly enquires into the senses as a source of knowledge and 
points out that although our senses sometimes deceive us in relation to things that 
are not clearly perceptible and things at a great distance, it would be unreasonable to 
doubt certain things that are presented to our senses. The senses are in other words 
mostly trustworthy. For example, the fact that he is sitting by the fire, in his dressing 
gown, with a piece of paper in his hand of which he is aware through his senses, 
cannot reasonably be doubted. That is, unless he were a madman, who believes that 
he is a king when he is in fact poor; or who believes that he is wearing gold and purple 
when in fact he is naked; or who imagines that his head is made of earthenware, that 
he is a pumpkin or is made of glass. But, says Descartes, he himself is clearly not mad, 
and it would be foolish of him to follow their example and deny the truthfulness of the 
senses. (2) Let us then go further, says Descartes, and consider that I might be asleep 
and dreaming everything that my senses represent to me, that is, that I am sitting 
here in front of the fire, etc. In sleep we are after all often deceived into believing that 
what we experience is an experience in real life. Let us assume then that I am asleep, 
Descartes says, are there then not still certain things which remain indubitable? 
Indeed. It is like a painter who paints something which does not exist in reality. Even 
then the forms or at least the colours will be real. Similarly physics, astronomy, 
medicine etc., may contain many doubtful things, but ultimately they are based on 
mathematics, geometry and other similar sciences which, despite the fact that they 
may not exist, are certain and indubitable. These are in other words truths of a non-
sensory origin which are true, whether or not one is awake or asleep (Derrida 1978, p. 
46). Even if I am asleep, Descartes concludes, ‘two and three together always make 
five, and a square never has more than four sides’ (Descartes 1968, p. 98). (3) 
                                                 
11
 See in this respect the confession of Foucault in Foucault Politics, Philosophy, Culture 312: ‘[W]hat remained 
of traditional philosophical discourse in the work that I had done on the subject of madness embarrassed me. 
There is a certain Hegelianism surviving there. It isn’t necessarily enough to deal with such menial things as 
police reports, measures taken for confinement, the cries of madmen to escape from philosophy. For me 
Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, Klossowski were ways of escaping from philosophy.’ How especially Blanchot 
assists in this respect, we will see below. 
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Descartes then goes even further to place all his certainties in doubt, this time by 
going beyond both sensory and non-sensory foundations, and questions the 
metaphysical foundations of his knowledge. He now imagines that the God in whom 
he has always believed as being all-powerful may actually be an evil genius who has 
decided to deceive him so that all the certainties he has just established are only such 
because of deception. This places in doubt all his certainties, Descartes acknowledges.  
For Foucault, the most important passage in the above process of questioning lies 
in the first section, and specifically in the following sentence of Descartes (1968, p. 
96): ‘But these are madmen, and I would not be less extravagant if I were to follow 
their example’. Foucault focuses his analysis on the first two parts of the procedure 
((1) and (2) above) and draws a distinction between three forms of doubt: (a) error of 
the senses, (b) dreams and (c) madness. In the case of (a) and (b), truth does not slip 
away completely. There is still a residue of truth that remains in both instances. In the 
words of Foucault (2006, p. 45):  
 
Thus neither sleep peopled with images nor the clear consciousness that the senses 
are deceived can lead doubt to its most universal point: we might admit that our 
eyes can deceive us, and “suppose we are asleep”, but the truth will never slip away 
entirely into darkness. 
 
It is however different with madness. Here all truth dissolves, Foucault contends. 
Descartes consequently does not delve on it as extensively as he does on dreams, but 
simply excludes it by decree as appears from the quotation from Descartes’s 
Meditations referred to above. This is because to think (ego cogito ergo sum) 
excludes the possibility of being mad. There can be little doubt about the originality of 
this reading which provides an excellent introduction to this chapter which will, 
following upon this ‘philosophical internment’, continue to trace the political decree 
of the great internment of madness. It however comes at a price. Apart from the fact 
that Descartes’s text needs to be distorted to arrive at this reading,12 it restricts the 
meaning of madness to something calculable and excludes from the reading 
Descartes’s consideration of ‘total madness’ which exceeds metaphysics. This ‘total 
madness’ nonetheless corresponds with Foucault’s definition of madness as ‘the 
absence of a work’ or ‘the absence of an œuvre’ (Derrida 1978, p. 54; Foucault 2006, 
p. xxxi).13  
In his analysis of Descartes’s First Meditation, Derrida (1978, p. 48) points out that 
Descartes does not, as Foucault contends, ‘sidestep the possibility of dream or error’ 
and that it is not the case that ‘[d]reams and illusions are overcome by the very 
structure of truth’ (Foucault 2006, pp. 44 and 45). There is firstly no sidestepping or 
circumvention because Descartes follows a procedure in which firstly the senses are 
                                                 
12
 Derrida’s contentions in this regard clearly show that he is not of the view that correctness in reading is no 
longer a requirement. Correctness and truth are displaced in Derrida’s thinking, not discarded. This said, 
Derrida’s reading of Descartes is by no means an orthodox one. 
13
 Alan Bass, the translator of Derrida’s ‘Cogito’ understands this as a work which is not governed by 
institutionalised rationalism; Derrida (1978, p. 308 n. 6). We will return to this again in Foucault’s description of 
Blanchot’s ‘novels’.  
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questioned and then radically or hyperbolically placed in doubt (steps (1) and (2) 
above), whereafter even mathematical truth (which is all that remains after raising 
these ‘natural’ reasons for doubt) does not escape from being placed in doubt. 
Mathematical truth will more specifically be placed in doubt by ‘the artificial and 
metaphysical assault of the evil genius’ (Derrida 1978, p. 46). According to Derrida, 
the reason why Descartes deals with dreams in greater detail (than with the other 
forms of sensory deception) is because what applies in the case of dreams, applies 
with even stronger reason in the case of sensory perception: certainties and truths of 
a non-sensory and non-imaginative14 origin are the only ones that escape sensory 
error and oneiric composition (Derrida 1978, p. 48). Sensory and imaginative sources 
can thus not provide one with certainty. Dreams and illusions consequently also 
cannot, as Foucault contends, be overcome or surmounted by the structure of truth, 
because Descartes is prepared to posit the possibility of total error for all knowledge 
gained from the senses and imaginary constructions. The only certain things which 
remain at this point (before the arrival of the evil genius) are that which is simple 
(such as colour) and intelligible (Derrida 1978, p. 49). Insofar as the purely 
intelligible (for example, two plus three equals five) still remains at this point (a 
provisional certainty which is no longer of a sensory or imaginative nature) it will, as 
said before, be placed radically in doubt in the next step. The ‘exclusion’ of madness 
at this point moreover does not occur for the reasons Foucault asserts, but simply 
because the madness that is invoked here (the popular and everyday idea of madness) 
is not wrong about everything, is not mad enough. Madness in this form does not 
provide the most serious form of sensory illusion. In this sense, the dreamer is more 
insane than the madman (Derrida 1978, p. 50) and the invocation of the evil genius 
will proceed further to posit the possibility of total madness.  
Wherein lies the importance of Descartes’s evil genius and the importance of 
taking account of it in writing a history of madness? We are of course at this point no 
longer concerned with natural doubt (stages (1) and (2)) but the fiction or hypothesis 
of the evil genius (stage 3). Derrida’s description of the total madness that is at stake 
here clearly goes beyond the popular conception thereof and is of great importance 
for the rest of our discussion: 
 
Now, the recourse to the fiction of the evil genius will evoke, conjure up, the 
possibility of a total madness, a total derangement over which I could have no 
control because it is inflicted upon me – hypothetically – leaving me no 
responsibility for it. Total derangement is the possibility of a madness that is no 
longer a disorder of the body, of the object, the body-object outside the boundaries 
of the res cogitans, outside the boundaries of the policed city, secure in its 
existence as thinking subjectivity, but is a madness that will bring subversion to 
pure thought and to its purely intelligible objects, to the field of its clear and 
distinct ideas, to the realm of the mathematical truths which escape natural doubt 
(Derrida 1978, pp. 52-53). 
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 As examples of products of the imagination, Descartes (1968, p. 97) refers to pictures and painting.  
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Derrida at this point seeks to, at least partially, defend Descartes from Foucault’s 
accusation to the effect that he (Descartes) was the first philosopher to intern 
madness through an act of force and exteriorise it from the Cogito (I who think, I 
cannot be mad), upon which followed the political internment. Derrida’s contention 
here, tying in with our discussion above, is firstly that the ‘exclusion’ of madness is 
not something that happens at a determinate point in history. If madness is indeed 
the absence of a work, as Foucault contends, then language by its nature excludes 
madness which is essentially silence, stifled speech (Derrida 1978, p. 54).15 This is not 
imposed at one determinate moment in history rather than another (for example with 
Descartes) but is linked to an act of force which opens up history and speech in 
general. This silence, like non-meaning, furthermore continues to haunt language as 
its resource. At stake here is not a determinate language, for example Latin or French 
(the languages of Descartes), but language in general. Through his own language (in 
general), Descartes reassures himself that he is not insane. Language, conceived in its 
essence (in other words, metaphysically) therefore entails the break with madness, 
and ‘it adheres more thoroughly to its essence and vocation, makes a cleaner break 
with madness, if it pits itself against madness more freely and gets closer and closer 
to it’ (Derrida 1978, p. 55). Foucault’s History, Derrida contends, similar to 
Descartes’s Meditations, seeks to in this way get closer to madness so as to protect 
itself against it and to intern it.   
Madness is moreover not simply exterior to philosophy as Foucault contends, 
especially after Descartes. The certainty of the Cogito is attained not by containing or 
interning madness, but by asserting itself in the midst of madness. Descartes’s 
argument in other words amounts to the following: ‘I think, even if I am completely 
mad’. Derrida (1978, p. 56) reads Descartes here as going beyond a determined 
reason and a determined unreason to a ‘zero point at which determined meaning and 
nonmeaning come together in their common origin’.16 This is the ‘moment’, as 
Derrida (1978, p. 58) adds later, ‘when reason and madness have not as yet been 
separated’. Derrida finds in this ‘point’ the condition of possibility of Foucault’s 
narration of the history of madness.17 It is from this point that determinate forms of 
the opposition between reason and unreason can appear as such and be stated. At this 
point, which is also the proper and inaugural moment of the Cogito, there is as 
Derrida (1978, p. 56) notes, still very little certainty attached to the Cogito – it is not 
in the least reassuring.18 Descartes’s project is in this respect not dissimilar to that of 
Socrates who contemplates the good beyond being (epekeina tes ousias) which 
Glaucon in Plato’s Republic refers to as a ‘daemonic superiority’ (Plato 1997, pp. 1129-
1130 [509b-c]). The latter is as little reassuring and far exceeds the Greek notion of 
hybris, if we understand the latter as a pathological modification in man (Derrida 
                                                 
15
 These passages should not be understood as an indication of essentialism on Derrida’s part. What he describes 
here is the essence of language in metaphysics.  
16
 The notion of ‘origin’ should be placed in quotation marks, because what is at stake here is more precisely a 
pre-origin, the ‘origin of origin’.  
17
 Derrida (1978, p. 309 n. 24) also notes that it is less a question of ‘point’ than of an original temporality, or 
what he elsewhere refers to as a ‘past that has never been present’; see Derrida (1986, p. 79b). 
18
 There is of course an allusion here to Foucault (2006, p. xxix), who as we saw earlier, refers to ‘the reassuring 
dialectics of Socrates’. 
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1978, p. 57).  Foucault, by ignoring or not giving sufficient attention to Descartes’s 
radical placing in question of all certainties through his invocation of the evil genius, 
excludes total madness from consideration and thus performs an even greater 
exclusionary act than he (unfairly) accuses Descartes of performing.19 Foucault in 
other words reduces Descartes’s project and encloses it within a determined historical 
structure, whereas what is at stake here far exceeds this structure. Derrida (1978, p. 
309 n. 26) therefore provocatively refers to Foucault’s discourse as being totalitarian 
in as far as it ‘risks erasing the excess by which every philosophy (of meaning) is 
related, in some region of its discourse, to the nonfoundation of unmeaning’. The 
‘totalitarian’ nature of Foucault’s discourse also appears from his reading of Descartes 
to the extent that it involves a certain violence which reduces that which is hyperbolic 
(in Descartes) to what is intra-worldly. It is this violence which makes possible our 
conception of madness or what Derrida (1978, p. 57) refers to as the ‘making possible 
[of] all straitjackets’. 
After having reached this extreme point, Descartes however immediately seeks to 
reassure himself by certifying the Cogito through God and by identifying the act of the 
Cogito with a reasonable reason (Derrida 1978, p. 58; Derrida 1974, pp. 97-98; 
Derrida 1982, pp. 294-296). He does this when he needs to temporalise the Cogito. 
Descartes contended earlier that the Cogito is valid only at the point where thought is 
attentive to itself (Derrida 1978, p. 58) which means that it needs to reassure itself 
through the positing of that which is stable and infinite (God and reason). In the end, 
as Derrida (1978, p. 58) notes, it is God alone (that is reason) who protects Descartes 
from the madness which the Cogito, left to itself, opens itself up to in the most 
hospitable way.20 Tying in with what was said earlier about the relation between 
language and reason, when one (as Descartes does), contemplates and retains the 
Cogito, communicates it as well as its meaning, one must not be mad. Viewed from 
the other side, to be mad is to not be able to make the Cogito as such appear to any 
other – even to myself. The madman, even if he could repel the evil genius, would not 
be able to tell himself this. He thus cannot say it, cannot express it in reasonable 
language (Derrida 1978, p. 59). This is, as we saw above, because language in its 
essence is reason and logos and constitutes the break with madness (Derrida 1978, p. 
55). From Descartes’s Meditations it therefore appears that philosophy is ‘the 
reassurance given against the anguish of being mad at the point of the greatest 
proximity to madness’ (Derrida 1978, p. 59).  
What happens in Derrida’s reading of Descartes is that the Cogito is divided into 
hyperbole which cannot be contained within a determined historical structure on the 
one hand, and a finite structure - that which can be so contained, on the other. It is 
this division which according to Derrida (1978, p. 60) defines the history of 
philosophy and makes historicity possible. Philosophy can in other words only exist 
by constantly imprisoning and oppressing madness, the madman within us (Derrida 
1978, p. 61). Foucault (2006, p. 343) notes something similar, stating that a power of 
                                                 
19
 This hyperbolic project, different from the rest of Descartes’s project, is in other words not something which 
can be reduced to a determined historical structure; Derrida (1978, p. 57). 
20
 This seemingly chance reference to hospitality will be taken up in Derrida’s texts of the 1990s and thereafter; 
see eg Derrida and Dufourmantelle (2000); Derrida (1999), and see further below.  
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unreason constantly keeps vigil around the Cogito. There is moreover, Derrida (1978, 
p. 60) adds, a continuing or unending dialogue in history between that which exceeds 
totality and that which is enclosed within totality. This constant movement is referred 
to by Derrida as différance, and he describes its functioning in Descartes’s 
Meditations as follows: 
 
[T]o-attempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole from whose heights thought is 
announced to itself, frightens itself, and reassures itself against being annihilated 
or wrecked in madness or in death. At its height hyperbole, the absolute opening, 
the uneconomic expenditure, is always reembraced by an economy and is 
overcome by economy. The relationship between reason, madness, and death is an 
economy, a structure of deferral whose irreducible originality must be respected 
(Derrida 1978, pp. 61-62). 
 
Derrida’s contention in ‘Cogito’ could be summarized by saying that Foucault’s 
archaeology of the silence of madness which exposes the distinction between reason 
and its other (madness) which is excluded finds itself positioned within a broader 
framework which operates on the basis of a more radical exclusion (of total madness). 
What Foucault describes is therefore a symptom of a broader phenomenon which 
characterises language and reason. Derrida can consequently be said to in large part 
agree with Foucault, whilst at the same time contending that what Foucault writes 
about in a determined age, applies to reason and language in general. In a 
sympathetic reading, Foucault can be shown to be aware of this, and to be engaging in 
such an analysis too. It is important to note that Derrida does not in any way cast 
doubt on the importance, necessity and legitimacy of Foucault’s project.21 He simply 
repeats what Foucault says about the concept of madness with reference to a madness 
which breaches all limits. 
 
Foucault and others however understood Derrida’s reading as an attack in relation to 
his whole project or at least as the expression of an opposition to (all of) Foucault’s 
thinking.22 In his first response, published in the Japanese journal Paideia in 
February 1972 (now also included as an appendix in the History), Foucault (2006, p. 
578) seeks to (further) distance himself from philosophy and furthermore to situate 
philosophy within the sphere of knowledge. Philosophy, Foucault asserts, does not 
provide a foundation for knowledge. Philosophical discourse in a given period is 
instead subject to conditions and rules for the formation of knowledge in the same 
way as any other form of discourse with rational pretension. The question which 
Foucault’s stance raises is whether philosophy can indeed be escaped by historicising 
it and then simply stepping outside of it. Both questions must be answered in the 
negative. In the first place, reason or meaning in general, which as we saw can be 
equated with the idea and name of God, cannot be historicised in this way without 
deceiving oneself (Derrida 1978, pp. 309-310 n. 27 and 28). This is because there is a 
                                                 
21
 See also Derrida (1998, p. 113) and Derrida and Roudinesco (2004, pp. 6, 10-12) 
22
 Foucault (2006, pp. 550-590).  
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‘oneness’ to reason which leaves one with limited options in protesting against it 
(Derrida 1978, p. 36). Secondly, all our concepts and the way in which they are 
organised, in this case, the concepts of madness, of experience, and of the event as 
well as the inside/outside distinction which Foucault (2006, p. 589) again invokes, 
stem from the Greek dawn of western philosophy and are consequently metaphysical 
in nature (Derrida 1978, p. 40). As we saw above, one of Derrida’s main arguments in 
‘Cogito’ and elsewhere is precisely that in believing that a simple escape from 
metaphysics is possible, one somewhat naively ends up repeating the gestures of 
metaphysics. The concept of history (archaeology) which Foucault employs here is, as 
we saw earlier, itself rational in nature (Derrida 1978, p. 36). The Hegelian dialectic, 
which is clearly at stake here, cannot in other words be successfully challenged from a 
position which believes itself to be simply exterior to philosophy. It can only be 
challenged from within (Derrida 1978, p. 36). Insofar as the reading of Descartes is 
concerned, Foucault in both responses defends his earlier reading in relation to 
determined madness by relying on similar ‘structural’ arguments. Foucault (2006, pp. 
570-572) furthermore rejects Derrida’s argument, specifically in relation to the evil 
genius, for structural reasons. He contends that when Descartes speaks of the evil 
genius this is ‘a voluntary exercise, controlled, mastered and carried out from 
beginning to end by a meditating subject who never allows himself to be surprised’ 
(Foucault 2006, p. 571). Derrida is said to erase this from Descartes’ text. This indeed 
appears to be the case from Descartes’s text, and Foucault cannot be accused of an 
incorrect reading. The difficulty with this reading is nevertheless its (metaphysical) 
assumption that Descartes, or for that matter any author, is capable of such an 
exercise.23 The reason why Derrida finds specifically this part of Descartes’s 
Meditation attractive is because there madness as a concept is put into play. It shows 
the relation between thinking and madness, not only in the text of Descartes, but in 
that of all writers, because of the nature of writing.24 For Foucault this is not 
important, because of the nature of his project – attempting to show how reason 
interns its other at a specific point in history. As we saw above, this is done at a cost. 
Foucault’s reading, also in his response to Derrida, has the consequence of excluding 
the (absolute) madness in ourselves from consideration.25  
 
Blanchot, Language and the law 
                                                 
23
 The same would apply to Foucault, which is why the attempt to separate the (earlier) aesthetic and the (later) 
more political Foucault (see eg Rajchman 1983, pp. 37-62; and Freundlieb 1995, pp. 301-344), cannot be fully 
subscribed to; see also Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009, p. 94) and Santini and Lapidus (2002, p. 81) who argue in 
favour of a more integrated reading of Foucault in this respect, based on a continuity in his thinking. The 
contention of the present article, as will appear from the section that follows, is that Foucault’s (earlier) relation 
to literature is something which was ultimately not possible to abandon. In other words, even if commentators 
are correct in asserting that Foucault explicitly rejected his earlier thinking on literature (which is by no means 
certain) this would not prevent any of his texts from being read in the manner proposed here; see also Saghafi 
(1996). An author is simply not able to constrain a text through his intention to prevent such a reading; see 
Derrida (1978, p. 178). 
24
  See also Flynn (1989, pp. 216-218). The accusation of textual solipsism on Derrida’s part (Foucault 2006, p. 
573; and Said 1978) is based on a grave misunderstanding; for a response to this accusation (by others), see 
Derrida (1988, p. 148).  
25
 This is what Derrida implicitly points out in ‘To do Justice to Freud’ (1998, pp. 70-118), without directly 
responding to Foucault. 
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We now arrive at the point where we need to consider more closely the relation of 
Foucault and Derrida to the law and to determine how this ties in with the discussion 
above of madness, language, death and desire. A text which ties in very closely with 
Derrida’s reading of Foucault, is Foucault’s ‘Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from 
Outside’, stemming from 1966 and published in book-form together with an essay of 
Blanchot on Foucault (Foucault and Blanchot, 1990).26 Foucault in this text, tying in 
with the confession referred to earlier of his having remained too Hegelian in the 
History of Madness,27 and in a clear attempt to exceed Hegel from within, analyses 
Blanchot’s ‘novels’, ‘narratives’ and ‘criticism’ in general and in particular, The Most 
High (Le Très-Haut, 1948) and Aminadab (1942). No ‘debate’ between Derrida and 
Foucault took place specifically in relation to these ‘novels’, but Derrida through the 
years engaged with a number of texts of Blanchot in a way which ties in very closely 
with Foucault’s reading. The above ‘novels’ of Blanchot can be said to involve a search 
for the ‘pre-origin’ or ‘law’ of language, and consequently also, because of their being 
bound to language, of literature and of law. Blanchot’s statement in The Song of the 
Sirens gives vivid expression to what is at stake here (Blanchot 1999, p. 445): ‘A very 
obscure struggle takes place between every tale and the encounter with the Sirens… 
What we call the novel was born of this struggle.’ As we can see from this statement 
and as will appear from the discussion that follows, the law of language as described 
by Foucault is interwoven with death as well as with desire or what he refers to as 
‘attraction’ and ‘negligence’. The discussion will proceed in two steps. Firstly there 
will be an analysis of the close relation between language and death in these and 
other texts of Blanchot, which ties in closely with the relation between madness and 
language posited earlier. Secondly, we will enquire into Foucault’s discussion of ‘the 
law itself’ in this text, and attempt to establish how this in turn ties in with Derrida’s 
reflections on justice referred to in the introduction. It will appear from the analysis 
that the notion of ‘law’ as used here should not too quickly be equated with positive 
law or some aspect or characteristic of positive law.  
 
Language and death 
 
Foucault starts and ends his essay on Blanchot with an analysis of the phrase ‘I 
speak’, alluding therewith to the last sentence in The Most High which ends with the 
following words: ‘Now, now I’m speaking’.28 This is the point at which Jeanne Galgut, 
the nurse of the main character, Henri Sorge, shoots him. Foucault contends that the 
‘I speak’ of Blanchot puts the whole of modern fiction to the test. To understand 
something of what is at stake here, an enquiry into language and its relation to death 
is required. Foucault notes in this regard, with reference to Blanchot, that ‘the word is 
                                                 
26
 In Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009, pp. 76-78) the importance of this text is emphasized in the context of 
Foucault’s thinking on law, although not analysed in detail. See further Johnston (1990, pp. 802-804) on the 
relation between Foucault’s reflections on madness and literature. 
27
 See n. 11 above. 
28
 This passage is later in the text quoted by Foucault (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, pp. 39, 55) and identified 
with the law (of speaking). 
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the manifest non-existence of what it designates’ (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 54; 
also at p. 18). Blanchot gives expression to this conception of language in ‘Literature 
and the Right to Death’ (Blanchot 1999, pp. 378-379). He points out there that 
language gives us power over that which is created through words, allowing us 
complete powers of manipulation, this however necessarily going along with the 
annihilation of ‘reality’. Blanchot (1999, p. 379) in this respect follows Hegel. In a text 
dating from 1803-4 Hegel notes that in becoming master of animals, in giving them 
names, Adam had to annihilate them in their existence. The meaning and expression 
of speech thus depends on an annihilation of living things. Only then, by creating 
them from out of the death into which they had appeared, can they take on meaning. 
Man is in this way condemned to not be able to approach or experience anything but 
through the creation of meaning, that is, being (Blanchot 1999, pp. 379-380). 
Although my language does not kill anyone, it can be said to announce such death. 
Language in other words announces the possibility of the person here ‘present’ being 
removed from her existence and plunged into nothingness (Blanchot 1999, p. 380). 
This is moreover only possible because of the person I am referring to being capable 
of death, being threatened by death at every moment, bound and joined to death.29 
Language can therefore be said to amount to a deferred assassination.  When I speak, 
death consequently also speaks in me. When I speak, death appears between me and 
the person I speak to. It constitutes the distance between us, but it also makes 
understanding between us possible. It is in other words death which allows me to 
grasp what I want to attain. Death ‘exists in words as the only way they can have 
meaning’ (Blanchot 1999, p. 380). Without death, Blanchot (1999, p. 380) adds, 
‘everything would sink into absurdity and nothingness’.  
Language is therefore negation, but this negation is made possible in the first place 
by the doubling of negation; in other words by ‘a being capable of non-being’ 
(Hartman 1955, 71), or perhaps rather, in light of what was said earlier, a being 
desiring its own non-being.30 Foucault therefore points out that we have also learnt 
(from inter alia Blanchot) that ‘the being of language is the visible effacement of the 
one who speaks’ (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 54). Words thus imply not only the 
death of what is named, but also the death of the one who speaks.31 By saying my own 
name, I am singing my own mourning song (Blanchot 1999, p. 380). In the words of 
Blanchot (1999, pp. 380-381), thereby also explaining the ‘unreadability’ of The Most 
High and of Aminadab, which take seriously this law of language: 
 
When I speak, I deny the existence of what I am saying, but I also deny the 
existence of the person who is saying it: if my speech reveals being in its non-
existence, it also affirms that this revelation is made on the basis of the non-
existence of the person making it, out of his power to remove himself from himself, 
to be other than his being. This is why, if true language is to begin, the life that will 
carry this language must have experienced its nothingness, must have “trembled in 
                                                 
29
 The same of course applies to other living beings as well as inorganic things, insofar as their death/destruction 
is concerned. 
30
 See n. 9 above 
31
 See similarly, ‘Signature, Event, Context’ in Derrida (1982, pp. 307-330).  
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the depths; and everything in it that was fixed and stable must have been shaken.” 
Language can only begin with the void; no fullness, no certainty can ever speak; 
something essential is lacking in anyone who expresses himself. Negation is tied to 
language. When I first begin, I do not speak in order to say something, rather a 
nothing demands to speak, nothing speaks, nothing finds its being in speech and 
the being of speech is nothing. This formulation explains why literature’s ideal has 
been the following: to say nothing, to speak in order to say nothing. 
 
Foucault clearly subscribes to the above, as can be seen in his analysis of the ‘I 
speak’ with which as noted earlier The Most High ends, or more precisely, 
commences, because this ‘novel’ is the outcome of Henri Sorge’s death, literature 
gaining ‘from death the possibility of speaking and the truth of speech’ (Blanchot 
1999, p. 378).32 Blanchot’s ‘I speak’ thus raises the question of language in its ‘raw 
state’, ‘an unfolding of pure exteriority’ (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 11).33 
Language thought in this way, Foucault points out, is no longer discourse and the 
communication of meaning; it gives expression to what we earlier referred to as the 
absence of an œuvre. This of course has important implications for the speaking 
subject who can now no longer be said to coincide with itself, but which fragments, 
disperses, scatters, disappears in the naked space of language. The speaking subject 
can no longer be viewed as a responsible agent in the traditional sense, as it is more 
accurately a non-existence through which language pours forth (Foucault and 
Blanchot 1990, p. 11). This brings us to the point where we can say, Foucault 
contends, that modern literature is not, as is often believed, characterised by a 
doubling-back, a self-designation, a self-reference or interiorization. The event from 
which ‘literature’ in the strict sense arises, rather involves a passage to the ‘outside’,34 
language getting as far away from itself as possible (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 
12). Literature hence shows itself not as a folding back, but as a gap, a dispersion of 
signs. Literature consequently concerns itself not with the positivity of language, but 
with the void which language takes as its space. Whereas in the past it was a matter of 
thinking through the truth, it is now a matter of thinking through fiction, Foucault 
points out (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, pp. 12-13). Foucault at this point contrasts 
                                                 
32
 We can also say that like any other statement, this statement (I speak) ‘does not require the presence or 
assistance of any party, male or female. The statement survives them a priori, lives on after them’ (Derrida 2004, 
p. 64). 
33
 The phrase ‘Blanchot’s “I speak”’ must of course be qualified because Blanchot makes us acutely aware of the 
distinction between the author, the narrator and the character(s) in fiction. Derrida speaks in this respect (in 
relation to Blanchot’s texts) of ‘a certain neutrality of the “narrative voice,” a voice without person, without the 
narrative voice from which the “I” posits and identifies itself’ (Blanchot and Derrida 1998, p. 27). In this 
division, another division is in turn announced: of the author, the narrator and the character(s) as themselves 
divided in themselves by death (Blanchot and Derrida 1998, pp. 53-54). Blanchot furthermore distinguishes 
between the narrative voice and the narratorial voice, the latter being the voice of the subject identical with itself 
(Derrida 2004, p. 86). The narrator, as Derrida (2004, pp. 99, 115) furthermore points out, is identical with death 
and at the same time condemned to live on in Blanchot’s texts. 
34
  The quotation marks are Foucault’s. Foucault thereby acknowledges the problematic nature of the 
metaphysical distinction between an inside and an outside. This also appears inter alia from his discussion of ‘the 
companion’ in Blanchot’s texts (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, pp. 47-52). Foucault’s description of the ‘outside’ 
as ‘there, open, without intimacy, without protection or retention’ and as never yielding its essence, furthermore 
clearly ties in with the notion of attraction, to be discussed below, and with death (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, 
pp. 27-28, 48 and 57).  
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Blanchot’s ‘I speak’ with Descartes’s ‘I think’. Whereas the latter was supposed to lead 
to the indubitable certainty of the I and its existence, Blanchot’s ‘I speak’ distances, 
disperses and effaces that existence. In light of our earlier enquiry, we can perhaps 
say that Blanchot, like Descartes before him, points to the evil genius as the condition 
of possibility of speech. In Blanchot however there is no attempt at a reassurance of 
the self after this ‘confrontation’. Can law follow Blanchot in the adoption of a 
narrative voice? Foucault’s challenge is for law to do so. 
 
The law itself 
 
In the paragraph ‘Where Is the Law, And What Does It Do?’ Foucault considers the 
manifestation and withdrawal of the law with reference to The Most High and 
Aminadab (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, pp. 33-40). From the discussion above and 
the context it can already be seen that the law which is at stake here is not simply 
(some dimension or mode of becoming of) modern law, but the law of language, a 
deathly desire in other words, total madness, the law itself. Foucault starts this 
paragraph by mentioning the relation between being negligent and the attraction of 
the law, which will be contrasted with the attempt to provoke the law, leading in turn 
to the simple opposition between law and punishment. Before we continue with a 
discussion of this distinction, a brief analysis of the notions of attraction and 
negligence is required.  Foucault earlier in the text draws a close parallel between 
what Blanchot refers to as attraction, Sade as desire, Nietzsche as force, Artaud as the 
materiality of thought, and Bataille as transgression. According to Foucault, all of 
these refer to ‘the pure, most naked, experience of the outside’ (Foucault and 
Blanchot 1990, p. 27). Attraction, as Foucault points out, implicitly referring to 
Aminadab,  
 
has nothing to offer but the infinite void that opens beneath the feet of the person 
it attracts, the indifference that greets him as if he were not there, a silence too 
insistent to be resisted and too ambiguous to be deciphered and definitively 
interpreted – nothing to offer but a woman’s gesture in a window, a door left ajar, 
the smile of a guard before a forbidden threshold, a gaze condemned to death 
(Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 28). 
 
Foucault furthermore points out that ‘negligence’ is the necessary correlate of 
attraction in Blanchot’s texts. He describes negligence as a total disregard for what 
one is doing and detects such a disregard in Thomas’s action in Aminadab when he 
enters the boarding house, simply because he refrains from entering the house across 
the street as well as in the fact that Thomas’s past, family and other life is of no 
relevance here; it is non-existent (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 28). The link which 
Foucault sees between attraction/negligence and death/madness appears very clearly 
from the paragraph on Eurydice and the Sirens where Foucault explores Blanchot’s 
The Gaze of Orpheus and The Song of the Sirens (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, pp. 
41-45). The enchantment of the Sirens, Foucault points out, lies in the fatal promise 
of their singing. The Sirens are only their song, a pure appeal. Their melody simply 
  
17 
 
promises a future song, to tell one all about oneself. This is both the truth and a lie: a 
lie, because listening to them inevitably leads to death; but also the truth, because 
death makes the song possible as well as the endless recounting of the heroes’ 
adventure (that is, ‘I speak’). Odysseus/Ulysses only survives to tell the tale because 
of his being tied to the mast and his crew’s ears having been plugged. Foucault sees 
Eurydice as a close relative of the Sirens. She is as enchanting as the Sirens, her 
enchantment lying in the promise of a face as compared to theirs which lies in song. 
Unlike Odysseus, Orpheus was not however chained to a mast, neither were his ears 
blocked. Orpheus could therefore be seized completely by the forbidden desire. This 
makes for an important difference between the triumphant narrative told by 
Odysseus and the lament and absolute loss of Orpheus. As Foucault points out, 
behind Odysseus’s narrative one can hear the inaudible lament of not having 
surrendered to the Sirens (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 43). Behind Orpheus’s 
laments one can on the other hand detect the glory of having seen for a fleeting 
moment the unattainable face (the open gaze of death), just before it concealed itself 
again in darkness.35  
 
At this point we can return again to Foucault’s reflections on the law itself, from 
which we will see how the latter ties in with the notions of attraction and negligence. 
The law, Foucault notes, is not self-evident and in the heart, as then it would simply 
be something in consciousness. It is also not present in a text, possible to decipher in 
a book, or possible to consult in a register. If it were so present (as, one could add, is 
the case with law in its manifestation, that is, positive law) it would have been 
possible to follow or disobey it. The law would then however have no power, force or 
prestige to demand respect. Foucault adds that the law haunts cities, institutions, 
conduct and gestures in a sovereign way; it always applies its might, irrespective of 
what one does, of the chaos that prevails. Provoking or violating the law is not 
sufficient to interrupt it as this simply leads to punishment.36 One cannot simply 
detach oneself from the law and observe its exercise from a distance. If you think you 
can do so and that the law applies only to other people, this is the moment that you 
are closest to the law, that you make it circulate. In this perpetual manifestation of the 
law (for example through public decrees) what the law says or wants is however never 
illuminated. Foucault explains this statement as follows: 
 
[T]he law is not the principle or inner rule of conduct. It is the outside that 
envelops conduct thereby removing it from all interiority; it is the darkness beyond 
its borders; it is the void that surrounds it, converting, unknown to anyone, its 
singularity into the gray monotony of the universal and opening around it a space 
of uneasiness, of dissatisfaction, of multiplied zeal. 
                                                 
35
 Derrida, in his analysis of Blanchot’s ‘The Instant of my Death’, gives expression to what is at stake here by 
referring to death as ‘an immense orgiastic jouissance’ (Blanchot and Derrida 1998, p. 68).  
36
 The implicit reference here is to The Most High which sketches in Hegelian terms the all-embracing concern of 
the law. This eg finds expression in the following remark of Bouxx (the revolutionary) in The Most High 
(Blanchot 1996, p. 42): ‘The State has pressed into service everything you can say and everything you can do. 
There isn’t a single thought that doesn’t bear its mark. All governments are like this.’ The Most High of course 
also seeks to go beyond Hegel in this respect. 
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And of transgression. How could one know the law and truly experience it, how 
could one force it to come into view, to exercise its powers clearly, to speak, 
without provoking it, without pursuing it into its recesses, without resolutely going 
ever farther into the outside into what is always receding? (Foucault and Blanchot 
1990, p. 34)37 
 
These enigmatic passages can be analysed endlessly. A few words on them will 
have to suffice here. From the preceding discussion of some of the concepts that 
appear in these passages such as the law, the outside, the void, negligence (which 
Foucault connects with zeal), and the phrase ‘to speak’, it has already appeared that 
these concepts resonate with Foucault’s reflections on madness.38 One should 
therefore be careful to avoid a reading of these passages which understands the law at 
stake here simply in terms of subjectivity, consciousness and interiority. Such a 
reading would shift the focus from the law itself to its manifestation, from the 
impossible to the possible, from madness to reason. It would risk installing law 
comfortably within metaphysics.39 An enquiry into the relation between transgression 
and provocation, referred to in the above passages, further shows what is at stake 
here, as well as its close relation to our earlier discussion of madness and desire. 
Foucault points out in this respect that Blanchot does not merely concern himself 
with the provocation of law, but also with its transgression (Foucault and Blanchot 
1990, p. 35). Whereas provocation simply confirms the law in its effectiveness, 
transgression is closely aligned to attraction/negligence: it seeks ‘to attract the law to 
itself; it always surrenders to the attraction of the essential withdrawal of the law; it 
obstinately advances into the opening of an invisibility over which it will never 
triumph’ (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 35).40 Transgression insanely, but simply, 
attempts to venerate the law; to reinforce the law in its weakness – the lightness of 
the night which is law’s ‘invincible, impalpable substance’ (Foucault and Blanchot 
1990, p. 35). The law, Foucault furthermore notes, ‘is the shadow towards which 
every gesture necessarily advances; it is itself the shadow of the advancing gesture’ 
(Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 35). In somewhat simpler terms: the transgression of 
law in its manifestation and in its collusion with reason, can, as in the case of 
literature, be undertaken only by approaching the law itself by way of an impossible 
                                                 
37
 See also Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009, pp. 78ff) where these passages are cited and discussed, in the process of 
the formulation of the main thesis of the book. 
38
 See similarly, Derrida’s remark in ‘The Law of Genre’ (Derrida 1992, p. 251): ‘The law is mad. The law is 
mad, is madness; but madness is not the predicate of law. There is no madness without the law; madness cannot 
be conceived before its relation to law. This is the law, the law is madness.’ Law’s division within itself also 
appears eg from Derrida (1987b, p. 15) where he speaks of ‘[t]he law itself, the law above other laws’. 
39
 In Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009, pp. 78-82), the ‘other law’ at stake in Foucault is viewed as one dimension of 
the law (in opposition to law’s determinate side) and as constantly on the move and responsive to new and/or 
fresh possibilities, instantiations and determinations. Law’s responsive dimension is also described as law 
necessarily assuming a ‘labile existence’, as ‘law’s constituently holding itself open to new ways of being’ (at p. 
82) and as holding ‘itself ever open to unthought possibilities’ (at p. 85). The authors in my view succeed to a 
greater extent in providing a reading of Foucault which exceeds metaphysics when they refer simply to 
something ‘radically uncontainable in Foucault’s law’ (at p. 2). 
40
 See also Derrida in Blanchot and Derrida (1998, p. 87) on Blanchot’s notion of transgression: ‘“Transgression 
transgresses out of passion, patience, passivity.” Transgression is thus not a decision, certainly not a decision as 
activity of the ego or voluntary calculation of the subject.’ 
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orgiastic desire for death, by way of total madness, a mad and impossible hospitality, 
infinite and unconditional, without limitation, control or reciprocity. 
 
Law’s absolute demand41 
 
The ‘projects’ of Foucault and Derrida have often been thought of as in opposition to 
each other. When one however carefully scrutinises their relation to the texts of 
Descartes and Blanchot, it appears that they share a certain space. This shared space 
is not however situated ‘within’, but at a certain ‘remove’ from metaphysics. A reading 
of Foucault and Derrida is in other words called for which allows us to see them as at 
a certain point exceeding metaphysics, a complete escape nevertheless remaining 
impossible. Such a reading allows us to view madness, also in Foucault’s texts, in a 
transgressive ‘sense’ and at the same time to appreciate the point or site from which 
he launches his radical and necessary critique of modernity. This ‘site’ speaks of a 
madness beyond reason, a deathly desire, an anachronous time, a past which has 
never been present and which always remains to come. Madness in this ‘sense’ can 
also be referred to as the law itself, justice or absolute hospitality. This mad 
hospitality, the law itself, enables us to see that behind the contingent and 
determined exclusion of ‘marginalised others’ which Foucault exposes, a more radical 
exclusion always takes place which makes these exclusions possible in the first place. 
These exclusions can never be fully justified, which opens up the law to 
transformation, not simply towards the possible, but the impossible; to law itself in 
its inevitable withdrawal. In the words of Foucault: 
 
The law averts its face and returns to the shadows the instant one looks at it; when 
one tries to hear its words, what one catches is a song that is no more than the fatal 
promise of a future song (Foucault and Blanchot 1990, p. 41). 
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 The heading is derived from Blanchot (1992, p. 24). 
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